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the rational connection between motive and action of which the jury
is presumed to have sufficient knowledge to infer the probability of
one from the other. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 671, 8 S. E. 584
(1889). The absence of motive raises the inference that action is
improbable. People v. Kepford, 52 Cal. App. 508, 199 Pac. 64 (1921);
State v. Santino, 186 S. W. 976 (Mo. 1916). Thus, if the note in the
principal case was in fact genuine, the jury might well infer that
Pollard probably would not conspire to produce perjured testimony to
that effect. The excluded evidence seems to have sufficient probative
value to justify a holding that its exclusion was error.
N. C. B.
WIRE-TAPPING EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE UNLESS BOTH
PARTIES CONSENT
Defendants were convicted on evidence gained by recording tele-
phone conversations between/ them and an informer who gave his
consent that federal agents record the conversations over an extension
phone. Held, this is illegal wire-tapping and the evidence gained
thereby is inadmissible. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F(2d) 888,
(C.C.A.2d, 1940), cert. denied, 61 S. Ct. 41 (1940).
Tapping wires to gain evidence to detect and convict criminals
does not violate the Federal Constitution. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). But the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1103
(1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1940), renders any information
gained in wire-tapping by federal agents or private persons inadmis-
sibl6 in evidence. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). A
refusal to allow defendant to examine the prosecution to determine the
extent to which the case is based on facts gained by wire-tapping is
reversible error. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This
ban on wire-tapping extends to both intrastate and interstate communi-
cations. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). In all these
cases interception was done secretly, without the knowledge or consent
of either communicant. In the principal case, however, the party
initiating the conversation authorized the wire-tapping. The Com-
munications Act allows only the "sender" to authorize an interception,
but the court solves this case by construing "sender" to mean both
communicants. It explains that since every telephone conversation is
antiphonal, the parties to it are alternately sender and receiver, and
that to allow one party to forfeit the other's privilege would defeat
the purpose of the act and the privilege granted. This result makes
illegal an effective method of crime detection and law enforcement,
but the over-riding policy expressed by the Court in the Nardone cases,
that of protecting individual liberties and the right Of privacy, must
prevail. In a concurring opinion, Judge A. Hand proposes that Con-
gress act to allow police officers restricted use of wire-tapping. Pro-
fessor Wigmore suggests the use of warrants, issued on oath as search
warrants are issued. 8 WIGMORE, EIDMENCE, (3d ed. 1940) § 2184b.
See Note (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 863; N. Y. CONST. (1938) Art. I, § 12.
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